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Abstract
This paper analyzes several interest rates time series from the United
Kingdom during the period 1999 to 2014. The analysis is carried out using
a pioneering statistical tool in the financial literature: the complexity-
entropy causality plane. This representation is able to classify different
stochastic and chaotic regimes in time series. We use sliding temporal
windows to assess changes in the intrinsic stochastic dynamics of the time
series. Anomalous behavior in the Libor is detected, especially around
the time of the last financial crisis, that could be consistent with data
manipulation.
PACS: 89.65.Gh Econophysics; 74.40.De noise and chaos
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1 Introduction
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) was established in 1986 by the
British Banking Association (BBA). Since then it has been a benchmark inter-
est rate for pricing several derivative financial instruments that are traded on
exchanges worldwide. In fact, Libor is one of the major reference interest rates
not only for the interbank market but also for other transactions. Many financial
contracts link the obligations of the contracting parties to Libor evolution.
On May 29, 2008, Mollenkamp and Whitehouse [27] published an article on
the Wall Street Journal casting doubts on the transparency of Libor settings
and implying that published rates were lower than those reported by credit
default swaps (CDS). Investigations by market authorities such as the US De-
partment of Justice and the European Commission detected data manipulation
and imposed severe fines to banks involved in such an illegal procedure. The
existing financial literature has provided no conclusive evidence of manipulation
of the Libor-fixing process. According to Ellis [12], studies carried out so far on
Libor manipulation have not analyzed the situation thoroughly. In fact, proof
of financial misconduct was based on internal bank e-mails and the confessions
of bank officials.
The aim of this paper is to fill some gaps in the financial literature in several
areas. First, we introduce a novel and powerful tool for analyzing economic
time series: the Complexity Entropy Causality Plane (CECP). One of the key
features of our proposed method is that it enables the discrimination of various
stochastic and chaotic regimes. It therefore goes beyond traditional econometric
analysis and could highlight changes in the hidden structure of complex systems
such as the financial market. Second, we offer an exhaustive analysis of different
interest rates in the United Kingdom (UK) market. Third, our results back
the investigations made by financial surveillance authorities such as the US
Department of Justice and the UK Financial Services Authority regarding Libor
settings.
Unlike previous studies, which analyzed interest rate spreads, we study the
raw Libor time series. Our methodology has two advantages: (i) it makes no
assumption about the underlying stochastic process governing interest rates,
and (ii) by working with one series at a time, it avoids the problem caused by
the interaction of (possibly) different stochastic dynamics.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a brief review
of previous analyses of the Libor evolution rate. In section 3 we describe the
method based on Information Theory. In section 4 we describe the data used
in the paper. In section 5 we present our results and in section 6 we draw our
main conclusions.
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2 Brief literature review
2.1 The efficient market hypothesis
Since the seminal work of Bachelier [4], prices in a competitive market have
been modeled as a memoryless stochastic process. This is because, according
to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, prices fully reflect all available information
[16]. Therefore, interest rates should also follow approximately a random walk
[15]. If the Libor was manipulated, a deterministic process will contaminate the
pure stochastic process that governs interest rates in a competitive market. This
situation will produce a deterioration in the informational efficiency of the time
series. It is known that informational efficiency can vary over time. This may
be due to several reasons. For example, Bariviera [9] argued that informational
efficiency in the Thai stock market is influenced by liquidity constraints, while
Bariviera et al. [8] detailed the influence of the 2008 financial crisis on the
memory endowment of the European fixed income market. Consequently we
aim to detect, by means of permutation information theory quantifiers, if this
deterioration is contemporary of the manipulation that was detected by market
authorities.
2.2 The Libor case
The British Bankers Association (BBA) defines Libor as “...the rate at which
an individual Contributor Panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by
asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just
prior to 11:00 [a.m.] London time”.
Every London business day, each bank in the Contributor Panel (selected
banks from BBA) makes a blind submission such that each banker does not know
the quotes of the other bankers. A compiler (Thomson Reuters) then averages
the second and third quartiles. This average is published and represents the
Libor rate on a given day. In other words, Libor is a trimmed average of the
expected borrowing rates of leading banks. Libor rates are published for several
maturities and currencies.
The effect on the economy of underhand Libor rigging is deep and wide. On
the one hand, it provides incorrect information on the true interbank lending
cost and introduces an incorrect signal for Libor-linked contracts. On the other
hand and, as highlighted by Stenfors [37], probably more importantly, it corrupts
a “key variable in the first stage of the monetary transmission mechanism”.
Many debt instruments issued at variable rate link the interest coupons
to Libor. This variable rate is often defined as “Libor+∆”, where “∆” is a
premium that is usually linked to borrower’s risk. If Libor underestimates the
true lending cost (the intrinsic time value of money), borrowers gain at the
expense of lenders. A lower Libor induces lower mortgage rates, which makes
it easier to buy homes and increase the volume of the real estate market at
the expense of other goods markets. This artificially inflates home prices and
related goods such as furniture and construction services. More generally, wrong
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interest rates modify consumption time preferences. Consequently, it is a topic
worth researching and scrutinizing.
Despite its important economic consequences, this topic has been overlooked
by mainstream economics and most research has been done by journalists. The
importance of a good pricing system is based on its usefulness for making de-
cisions. As Hayek [19] affirmed, “we must look at the price system as such a
mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real
function”. If the price system is contaminated but perceived as fair, the effect
could also reach the real economy and make it difficult to find a way out of the
financial crisis.
Taylor and Williams [38] documented the detachment of the Libor rate from
other market rates such as Overnight Interest Swap (OIS), Effective Federal
Fund (EFF), Certificate of Deposits (CDs), Credit Default Swaps (CDS), and
Repo rates. Snider and Youle [35] studied individual quotes in the Libor bank
panel and found that Libor quotes in the US were not strongly related to other
bank borrowing cost proxies.
Abrantes-Metz et al. [2] analyzed the distribution of the Second Digits
(SDs) of daily Libor rates between 1987 and 2008 and compared it with uniform
and Benford’s distributions. If we take into account the whole period, the null
hypothesis that the empirical distribution follows either the uniform or Benford’s
distribution cannot be rejected. However, if we take into account only the period
after the subprime crisis, the null hypothesis is rejected. This result calls into
question the “aseptic” setting of Libor. Monticini and Thornton [28] found
evidence of Libor underreporting after analyzing the spread between 1-month
and 3-month Libor and the rate of Certificate of Deposits using the Bai and
Perron [5] test for multiple structural breaks.
The economic consequences of a “contaminated” Libor can be diverse and
can have an uneven impact that affects several economic actors. The lack of in-
tegrity of Libor as an information signal gives market participants a wrong proxy
of borrowing costs, thus providing a bad rate for pricing financial products.
With regard to the fixed income market, emerging markets such as Ar-
gentina, Chile and Colombia issue sovereign bonds that are linked to Libor (see
Tercen˜o and Guercio [39]). Downward misreporting affects fixed income valua-
tion in the secondary market, which leads to an overvaluation of prices and a
reduction in the internal rate of return of bonds. This increases fixed income
portfolios and leads to better public accounts in those countries (due to the
lower interest load) and lower returns of fixed income mutual funds.
Finally, and unlike medium- and long-term markets (corporate bonds and
stocks), the money market plays a key role as a provider of liquidity to the
financial sector. Interest rates disclosed by the market are therefore used as a
measure of market liquidity and credit risk. Wrong market signals could lead
to improper monetary policies by the central banks.
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3 Symbolic time series analysis
3.1 The Bandt and Pompe method
Many real world phenomena, such as the one under analysis in this paper,
require the detailed analysis of observations at different time positions. One
of the goals of time series analysis is to describe the nature of the generating
process. Consequently, we can assume that a natural starting point for this
task is to find the appropriate probability density function (PDF) associated
to the time series. Among the several alternatives for PDF estimation, the
Bandt and Pompe (BP) [6] methodology has the advantage of considering time
causality in its estimation. This symbolic methodology is robust to the presence
of (observational) noise and requires no a priori model assumption. The starting
point of this method is to consider the ordinal structure of D−dimensional
partitions of the time series. “Partitions” are devised by comparing the order of
neighboring relative values rather than by apportioning amplitudes according
to different levels.
Given a time series S(t) = {xt; t = 1, · · · , N}, an embedding dimension
D > 1 (D ∈ N, and an embedding delay τ (τ ∈ N), the BP-pattern of order D
generated by
s 7→
(
xs−(D−1)τ , xs−(D−2)τ , · · · , xs−τ , xs
)
, (1)
is the one to be considered. To each time s, Bandt and Pompe method (BP)
assigns a D-dimensional vector that results from the evaluation of the time
series at times s − (D − 1)τ, s − (D − 2)τ, · · · , s − τ, s. Clearly, the higher
value of D, the more information about “the past” is incorporated into the
ensuing vectors. By the ordinal pattern of order D related to the time s, BP
mean the permutation π = (r0, r1, · · · , rD−1) of (0, 1, · · · , D − 1) defined by
xs−rD−1τ ≤ xs−rD−2τ ≤ · · · ≤ xs−r1τ ≤ xs−r0τ . In this way the vector defined
by Eq. (1) is converted into a definite symbol π. So as to get a unique result
BP consider that ri < ri−1 if xs−riτ = xs−ri−1τ . This is justified if the values
of xt have a continuous distribution so that equal values are very unusual.
For all the D! possible orderings (permutations) πi when embedding di-
mension is D, their associated relative frequencies can be naturally computed
according to the number of times this particular order sequence is found in the
time series, divided by the total number of sequences,
p(πi) =
♯{s|s ≤ N − (D − 1)τ ; (s) has type πi}
N − (D − 1)τ
. (2)
In the last expression the symbol ♯ stands for “number”. Thus, an ordinal
pattern probability distribution P = {p(πi), i = 1, · · · , D!} is obtained from the
time series.
As mentioned above, the ordinal-pattern’s associated PDF is invariant with
respect to nonlinear monotonous transformations. Accordingly, nonlinear drifts
or scalings artificially introduced by a measurement device will not modify the
quantifiers’ estimation, a nice property if one deals with experimental data (see
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e.g. Saco et al. [32]). These advantages make the BP approach more convenient
than conventional methods based on range partitioning. Additional advantages
of the method reside in i) its simplicity (we need few parameters: the pat-
tern length/embedding dimension D and the embedding delay τ) and ii) the
extremely fast nature of the pertinent calculation-process [21]. The BP method-
ology can be applied not only to time series representative of low dimensional
dynamical systems but also to any type of time series (regular, chaotic, noisy,
or reality based). In fact, the existence of an attractor in the D-dimensional
phase space in not assumed. The only condition for the applicability of the BP
method is a very weak stationary assumption: for k = D, the probability for
xt < xt+k should not depend on t.
For a review of BP’s methodology and its applications to physics, biomedical
and econophysics signals see Zanin et al. [41].
3.2 Permutation Information Theory quantifiers
We introduce an approach that uses quantifiers derived from Information The-
ory: entropy and statistical complexity. In order to evaluate these quantifiers,
we use the Bandt and Pompe permutation method [6] to estimate the probabil-
ity distribution associated with the time series. As is widely known, symbolic
time-series analysis methods that discretize the raw time series into a corre-
sponding sequence of symbols are able to analyze nonlinear data efficiently with
low sensitivity to noise. However, it is not easy to find a meaningful symbolic
representation of the original series. The Bandt and Pompe approach is the
only symbolization technique of those in popular use that takes into account
the time causality of the system’s dynamics. Important details concerning the
ordinal structure of the time series are then revealed.
We calculate two magnitudes: the permutation entropy and the permutation
statistical complexity of each series. According Shannon and Weaver [34], given
a discrete probability distribution P = {pi ∈ R; pi ≥ 0; i = 1, · · · ,M}, with∑M
i=1 pi = 1, Shannon entropy is defined as:
S[P ] = −
M∑
i=1
pi ln pi. (3)
This quantifier equals zero if the patterns are fully deterministic and reaches
its maximum value for a uniform distribution. Using informational entropy to
study economic phenomena is not new. In fact, Theil and Leenders[40], Fama
[13], and Dryden [11] may be considered seminal papers in this field. More
recently, Martina et al. [26] and Ortiz et al. [29] applied entropy and multiscale
entropy analysis to assess crude oil price efficiency. Alvarez-Ramı´rez et al.[3] also
used entropy methods to quantify the dynamics of the informational efficiency of
the US stock market over the last 70 years. Iglesias and de Almeida [20] showed
that some market models lead to a condensed state and, consequently, to a
state of minimum entropy. In order to recover a Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution,
some regulations must be included in the market. This study highlighted the
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importance of loans in order to achieve an state of maximum entropy at a given
market.
However, analyzing time series by means of Shannon entropy alone could be
insufficient. As stressed in Feldman and Crutchfield [17] and Feldman et al. [18],
an entropy measure does not quantify the degree of structure or patterns present
in a process and a measure of statistical complexity must be introduced into the
analysis in order to characterize a system’s organizational properties. A family
of statistical complexity measures, based on the functional form developed by
Lo´pez-Ruiz et al. [23], is defined in Mart´ın et al. [25] and Lamberti et al. [22]
as:
CJS = QJ [P, Pe]HS [P ] (4)
where HS [P ] = S[P ]/Smax is the normalized Shannon entropy, P is the discrete
probability distribution associated with the time series under analysis, Pe is the
uniform distribution and QJ [P, Pe] is the so-called disequilibrium:
QJ [P, Pe] = Q0{S[(P + Pe)/2]− S[P ]/2− S[Pe]/2}
with Q0 a normalization constant.
This disequilibrium is defined in terms of the Jensen-Shannon divergence,
which quantifies the difference between two probability distributions. Mart´ın et
al. [24] demonstrates the existence of upper and lower bounds for generalized
statistical complexity measures such as CJS . Additionally, as highlighted in
Soriano et al. [36], the permutation complexity is not a trivial function of the
permutation entropy because it is based on two probability distributions.
The planar representation of these quantifiers is introduced in efficiency anal-
ysis and has been successfully used to: rank efficiency in stock markets [43, 45];
rank efficiency in commodity markets [44]; link informational efficiency with
sovereign bond ratings [42]; and assess the impact of the establishment of a
common currency and a deep and wide financial crisis in European sovereign
bonds time series [10].
4 Data
Following Taylor and Williams [38], we selected several UK benchmark interest
rates. In addition to Libor we considered other relevant interest rates in the
UK market: the Repo benchmark (REPO), Overnight Interest Swaps (OIS)
and the Sterling OverNight Index Average (SONIA). The data span was from
17/05/1999 to 08/09/2014, with a total of 3996 data points, except for the
UK OIS rate, which began on 19/01/2004 (2776 data points). All data were
retrieved from DataStream. One main difference among these rates is that
Libor and Repo are calculated as the arithmetic averages of the middle two
quartiles of the estimations delivered by selected banks, whereas the other two
rates represent the averages of the actual transactions.
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5 Results
Using the above data and the methodology described in Section 3, we computed
the permutation entropy and permutation statistical complexity for each series
using sliding windows. The rationale behind the use of a moving sample was
that it enable us to study the evolution of these quantifiers during the period
under examination. Our sliding windows contained N = 300 data points, the
frequency was daily (τ = 1), and the step between each window was δ = 20
data points. In this way we obtained 184 estimation periods. The dates for the
beginning and end of each period are provided in the appendix.
It is worth mentioning that when we performed our analysis for pattern
length (embedding dimension) D = {3, 4, 5} using windows sample lengths
300 ≤ N ≤ 1500, we obtained similar results. We believe that with a pat-
tern length D = 4 and 300 data points we are able to capture the dynamics of
the series under analysis. Each window spans approximately one year and moves
one month ahead. In this way changes in the underlying stochastic process are
taken into account.
Following Zunino et al. [43, 45, 44] and Rosso et al. [31], we use the Bandt
and Pompe [6] permutation method to obtain the appropriate probability distri-
bution function. If a series is purely random, permutation entropy is maximized
and permutation statistical complexity is minimized. Since we work with nor-
malized quantifiers, the maximum efficiency point of the Complexity Entropy
Causality Plane (CECP) is (1, 0). We argue that, without manipulation, the
location of quantifiers across windows should be stable or at least follow no
predictable path.
5.1 Preliminary analysis
In Figure 1 we show the Complexity Entropy Causality Plane of UK data.
Each point reflects the calculations of permutation entropy and permutation
complexity for a period of the sliding window. We can see that SONIA, REPO
and OIS rates occupy the bottom right-hand area of the CECP. This area may
be associated with random processes that exhibit little or no memory (this
behavior is compatible with colored noises). In other words, information about
past prices is (almost) fully embedded in the current price, which according to
Fama [14], means that the market is informationally efficient in its weak form.
In contrast, the Libor rate is scattered throughout much of the CECP.
A simple way of observing the difference in the informational content of
each time series is by means of the descriptive statistics of the permutation
entropy estimations (see Table 1). Libor has a mean permutation entropy of
approximately 0.67, whereas HmeanOIS ≈ 0.91 H
mean
SONIA ≈ 0.94 and H
mean
Repo ≈ 0.87.
We preform the test of equality of means, in order to assess if Libor mean
permutation entropy is equal to the permutation entropy of each of the other
series. As shown in Table 3 of the appendix, the null hypothesis is rejected.
This result confirm the different path behavior of the series under analysis. We
would like to highlight that the range of the permutation entropy estimations
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Figure 1: Complexity Entropy Causality Plane for D = 4, τ = 1, δ = 20
of UK interest rates: the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the Repo
benchmark (REPO), Overnight Interest Swaps (OIS) and Sterling OverNight
Index Average (SONIA). The data span was from 17/05/1999 until 08/09/2014,
except for UK OIS rate, which began on 19/01/2004. The solid lines represent
the upper and lower bounds of the quantifiers as computed by Mart´ın et al. [24]
differs enormously, and that the minimum value for OIS, SONIA and Repo is
around 0.75, whereas the minimum for Libor is 0.20.
In order to highlight that the planar location of the quantifiers were not
obtained by chance, we display in Figure 2 the results of the original Libor
series and the those of the randomized Libor series. When we shuffle data and
thus, destroy all non trivial correlations, permutation informations quantifiers
move close to the (1, 0) corner. This picture shows that the proposed quantifiers
capture the hidden correlation structure of data.
5.2 Temporal evolution of the informational efficiency
We can use figure 1 to analyze the direction of movement over time, focusing
on the Libor rate (see Fig 3).
We can clearly see that the Libor rate performed relatively well (i.e. following
dynamics that are compatible with a random walk) until the estimation of time
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the permutation entropy of each series, and
test of mean equality of each series with respect to Libor.
Libor OIS Repo SONIA
Mean 0.66915 0.91410 0.86932 0.94137
Median 0.68425 0.92786 0.88005 0.94930
Std. Dev 0.15697 0.04227 0.05302 0.03020
Min 0.20053 0.78696 0.73237 0.85500
Max 0.90555 0.97988 0.94743 0.98502
F 13.78748 8.76667 27.01272
p-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
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Figure 2: Complexity Entropy Causality Plane of original Libor series and ran-
domized Libor series.
window 69, (H,C)(LIBOR) = (0.843, 0.169), which corresponds to the period be-
tween August 2004 and September 2005, where there is a trend left and upwards.
This trend continues until time window 91, (H,C)(LIBOR) = (0.569, 0.236),
which corresponds to the period between April 2006 and June 2007, where
we see a backward movement in the path until window 107, (H,C)(LIBOR) =
(0.732, 0.221), corresponding to the period between July 2007 and August 2008.
This point reflects several distinctive characteristics.
First, we clearly observe a path toward areas of inefficiency, i.e. higher per-
mutation complexity and lower permutation entropy. Second, there is a clear
separation between Libor and the other interest rates in the CECP. Third, this
period coincides with the beginning of the upheaval in the financial markets due
to the subprime crisis. And fourth, Mollenkamp and Whitehouse [27] published
their seminal article on possible Libor manipulation in The Wall Street Jour-
nal. According to [30], the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was aware of
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manipulative activities as early as 2008.
The temporal movements of the points in the CECP cannot be attributed
to chance but to either a change in the underlying statistical laws governing
the money market or to hidden manipulation by market participants. Although
statistical methods themselves cannot prove the existence of manipulation, they
could be useful early warning devices for surveillance authorities such as central
banks or exchange commissions to propose in-depth investigations.
Based on Figure 1, we drew a conceptual scheme of the movement of the
permutation information quantifiers (see Figure 3). We took a subsample of the
sliding windows in a proportion of 1:4 in order to avoid a saturated figure and
linked four consecutive windows where the numbers indicate the direction of the
movement.
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Figure 3: Complexity Entropy Causality Plane for D = 4, τ = 1, δ = 20.
Conceptual scheme of the movement of the permutation information quantifiers
for the evolution of UK Libor.
The path toward a more informationally inefficient area continues until win-
dow 151, (H,C)(LIBOR) = (0.201, 0.155), which corresponds to the period
between November 2010 and January 2012 (see Fig. 1). After this period, a
U-turn is observed and the trend is reversed, as we can see in Figure 3. Our esti-
mations reflect a slow but constant improvement in the informational efficiency
of the Libor time series. In Figure 1, the point corresponding to window 183,
(H,C)(LIBOR) = (0.670, 0.074), corresponding to the period between April
11
2013 and June 2014, is located at a similar entropy level to that of window
55, (H,C)(LIBOR) = (0.678, 0.127), which corresponds to the period between
July 2003 and August 2004. This improvement appears to be consistent with
the revelation of the Libor scandal and the subsequent reform in Libor setting
characteristics.
This is particularly important because the inefficiency path has not been fol-
lowed by other interest rates. If Libor behavior is clearly different from that of
other interest rate behavior, what is the difference between Libor and the other
selected interest rates? The answer could lie in the highly intrinsic character-
istics of the Libor rate. In fact, Libor and Repo methodology on the one hand
and OIS and SONIA methodology on the other differ substantially. Whereas
OIS and SONIA both reflect an average of actual transactions, Libor and Repo
benchmark rates reflect trimmed averages of the self-estimated borrowing costs
of a selected group of banks. Libor and Repo benchmarks do not necessar-
ily reflect effective market transaction. In fact, the Libor quotes of individual
banks are non-binding. We could say that Libor reflects the perceptions or de-
sires of decision-makers (to the best of their knowledge) better than a bank’s
true borrowing costs. Libor therefore does not reflect an equilibrium price like
a Walrasian auctioneer does. More closely, it reflects the rate at which panel
banks would like to borrow from their colleagues.
We would like to reiterate that the purpose of our methodology was not
to detect data manipulation. However, by using this methodology we were
able to detect a significant change in the stochastic process governing the Libor
time series that overlaps with the landmark moments of the beginning of Libor
manipulation and the detection of the Libor scandal. Bearing in mind that
several banks admitted their participation in manipulation activities and paid
enormous fines for abusing their market positions (see e.g. [7] and [33]), we can
affirm that our methodology, whose purpose is to describe the stochastic and/or
chaotic features of time series, is a suitable tool for detecting exogenous forces
that alter normal price setting in a competitive market.
To clarify our claim, Figure 4 shows the temporal evolution of the permuta-
tion entropy of all the interest rates. We can clearly see that the permutation
entropies of the rates that reflect actual transactions (OIS and SONIA) are
relatively high and that their movement is bounded between 0.8 and 1. On
the other hand, the permutation entropy of the Libor rate deteriorates progres-
sively, reaching an absolute minimum (HS ≈ 0.2) in period 151. After this
point there is a steady recovery in the higher levels of permutation entropy. If
we set an imaginary linear trend line, we find that although Libor recovered a
path towards more random dynamics, the trend during the whole period was to
decrease. Libor is the only interest rate that showed this trend.
The behavior of Repo is probably half-way between that of Libor and that
of the other rates. Although the method used to calculate Repo is similar to
that used to calculate Libor, Repo assumes an underlying asset as collateral.
This could make Repo less prone to manipulation.
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Figure 4: Permutation entropy evolution, computed for D = 4, τ = 1, δ = 20,
of the various UK interest rates: the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR),
the Repo benchmark (REPO), Overnight Interest Swaps (OIS) and the Sterling
OverNight Index Average (SONIA). The data span was from 17/05/1999 to
08/09/2014, except for the UK OIS rate, which began on 19/01/2004.
6 Conclusions
We have applied a novel technique in Finance to detect changes in the underlying
stochastic/chaotic process that governs the movements of interest rates. This
technique uses two concepts borrowed from Information Theory: permutation
entropy and permutation statistical complexity. Using sliding windows we reveal
the mutating stochastic character of the interest rates time series.
Unlike previous works we provide a quantitative methodology for accessing
Libor dynamics. Antitrust law enforcement is complex because manipulation
and fraud can be elegantly camouflaged. It is difficult for a statistical procedure
to be accepted as legal proof in a court of law. However, its use by surveillance
authorities makes any attempt at manipulation more costly and more difficult
to continue. We therefore view our proposal as a market watch mechanism
that could make attempts at manipulation and/or collusion more difficult in the
future. Moreover, an efficient overseeing mechanism could increase the incentive
to apply for leniency at earlier stages of manipulation [1].
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Libor clearly moved far away from a memoryless stochastic process. The
low permutation entropy and high statistical complexity exhibited in the peak
of the financial crisis clearly indicates the existence of a complex structure of
temporal correlations.
Symbolic analysis reveals the peculiar behavior of Libor vis-a`-vis other se-
lected rates. We cannot affirm that manipulation was the cause of this strange
behavior. However, given the outcome of the Libor investigations conducted
by several financial authorities, we could say that our findings are consistent
with some kind of “non-invisible hand”. We believe that surveillance authori-
ties should use advanced statistical techniques such as the one proposed in this
paper to enhance market discipline.
We would like to stress that our methodology is easy to implement. Also, as
we have shown in this paper, updating data every month provides an overview
of how market prices are behaving.
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Appendix
A Dates of each estimation period
Table 2 and Table 3 contain the initial and final dates of each sliding window.
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Table 2: Initial and final dates of each estimation period
# Begins Ends # Begins Ends # Begins Ends
1 17-May-99 7-Jul-00 31 3-Sep-01 25-Oct-02 61 22-Dec-03 11-Feb-05
2 14-Jun-99 4-Aug-00 32 1-Oct-01 22-Nov-02 62 19-Jan-04 11-Mar-05
3 12-Jul-99 1-Sep-00 33 29-Oct-01 20-Dec-02 63 16-Feb-04 8-Apr-05
4 9-Aug-99 29-Sep-00 34 26-Nov-01 17-Jan-03 64 15-Mar-04 6-May-05
5 6-Sep-99 27-Oct-00 35 24-Dec-01 14-Feb-03 65 12-Apr-04 3-Jun-05
6 4-Oct-99 24-Nov-00 36 21-Jan-02 14-Mar-03 66 10-May-04 1-Jul-05
7 1-Nov-99 22-Dec-00 37 18-Feb-02 11-Apr-03 67 7-Jun-04 29-Jul-05
8 29-Nov-99 19-Jan-01 38 18-Mar-02 9-May-03 68 5-Jul-04 26-Aug-05
9 27-Dec-99 16-Feb-01 39 15-Apr-02 6-Jun-03 69 2-Aug-04 23-Sep-05
10 24-Jan-00 16-Mar-01 40 13-May-02 4-Jul-03 70 30-Aug-04 21-Oct-05
11 21-Feb-00 13-Apr-01 41 10-Jun-02 1-Aug-03 71 27-Sep-04 18-Nov-05
12 20-Mar-00 11-May-01 42 8-Jul-02 29-Aug-03 72 25-Oct-04 16-Dec-05
13 17-Apr-00 8-Jun-01 43 5-Aug-02 26-Sep-03 73 22-Nov-04 13-Jan-06
14 15-May-00 6-Jul-01 44 2-Sep-02 24-Oct-03 74 20-Dec-04 10-Feb-06
15 12-Jun-00 3-Aug-01 45 30-Sep-02 21-Nov-03 75 17-Jan-05 10-Mar-06
16 10-Jul-00 31-Aug-01 46 28-Oct-02 19-Dec-03 76 14-Feb-05 7-Apr-06
17 7-Aug-00 28-Sep-01 47 25-Nov-02 16-Jan-04 77 14-Mar-05 5-May-06
18 4-Sep-00 26-Oct-01 48 23-Dec-02 13-Feb-04 78 11-Apr-05 2-Jun-06
19 2-Oct-00 23-Nov-01 49 20-Jan-03 12-Mar-04 79 9-May-05 30-Jun-06
20 30-Oct-00 21-Dec-01 50 17-Feb-03 9-Apr-04 80 6-Jun-05 28-Jul-06
21 27-Nov-00 18-Jan-02 51 17-Mar-03 7-May-04 81 4-Jul-05 25-Aug-06
22 25-Dec-00 15-Feb-02 52 14-Apr-03 4-Jun-04 82 1-Aug-05 22-Sep-06
23 22-Jan-01 15-Mar-02 53 12-May-03 2-Jul-04 83 29-Aug-05 20-Oct-06
24 19-Feb-01 12-Apr-02 54 9-Jun-03 30-Jul-04 84 26-Sep-05 17-Nov-06
25 19-Mar-01 10-May-02 55 7-Jul-03 27-Aug-04 85 24-Oct-05 15-Dec-06
26 16-Apr-01 7-Jun-02 56 4-Aug-03 24-Sep-04 86 21-Nov-05 12-Jan-07
27 14-May-01 5-Jul-02 57 1-Sep-03 22-Oct-04 87 19-Dec-05 9-Feb-07
28 11-Jun-01 2-Aug-02 58 29-Sep-03 19-Nov-04 88 16-Jan-06 9-Mar-07
29 9-Jul-01 30-Aug-02 59 27-Oct-03 17-Dec-04 89 13-Feb-06 6-Apr-07
30 6-Aug-01 27-Sep-02 60 24-Nov-03 14-Jan-05 90 13-Mar-06 4-May-07
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Table 3: Initial and final dates of each estimation period (cont.)
# Begins Ends # Begins Ends # Begins Ends
91 10-Apr-06 1-Jun-07 121 28-Jul-08 18-Sep-09 151 15-Nov-10 6-Jan-12
92 8-May-06 29-Jun-07 122 25-Aug-08 16-Oct-09 152 13-Dec-10 3-Feb-12
93 5-Jun-06 27-Jul-07 123 22-Sep-08 13-Nov-09 153 10-Jan-11 2-Mar-12
94 3-Jul-06 24-Aug-07 124 20-Oct-08 11-Dec-09 154 7-Feb-11 30-Mar-12
95 31-Jul-06 21-Sep-07 125 17-Nov-08 8-Jan-10 155 7-Mar-11 27-Apr-12
96 28-Aug-06 19-Oct-07 126 15-Dec-08 5-Feb-10 156 4-Apr-11 25-May-12
97 25-Sep-06 16-Nov-07 127 12-Jan-09 5-Mar-10 157 2-May-11 22-Jun-12
98 23-Oct-06 14-Dec-07 128 9-Feb-09 2-Apr-10 158 30-May-11 20-Jul-12
99 20-Nov-06 11-Jan-08 129 9-Mar-09 30-Apr-10 159 27-Jun-11 17-Aug-12
100 18-Dec-06 8-Feb-08 130 6-Apr-09 28-May-10 160 25-Jul-11 14-Sep-12
101 15-Jan-07 7-Mar-08 131 4-May-09 25-Jun-10 161 22-Aug-11 12-Oct-12
102 12-Feb-07 4-Apr-08 132 1-Jun-09 23-Jul-10 162 19-Sep-11 9-Nov-12
103 12-Mar-07 2-May-08 133 29-Jun-09 20-Aug-10 163 17-Oct-11 7-Dec-12
104 9-Apr-07 30-May-08 134 27-Jul-09 17-Sep-10 164 14-Nov-11 4-Jan-13
105 7-May-07 27-Jun-08 135 24-Aug-09 15-Oct-10 165 12-Dec-11 1-Feb-13
106 4-Jun-07 25-Jul-08 136 21-Sep-09 12-Nov-10 166 9-Jan-12 1-Mar-13
107 2-Jul-07 22-Aug-08 137 19-Oct-09 10-Dec-10 167 6-Feb-12 29-Mar-13
108 30-Jul-07 19-Sep-08 138 16-Nov-09 7-Jan-11 168 5-Mar-12 26-Apr-13
109 27-Aug-07 17-Oct-08 139 14-Dec-09 4-Feb-11 169 2-Apr-12 24-May-13
110 24-Sep-07 14-Nov-08 140 11-Jan-10 4-Mar-11 170 30-Apr-12 21-Jun-13
111 22-Oct-07 12-Dec-08 141 8-Feb-10 1-Apr-11 171 28-May-12 19-Jul-13
112 19-Nov-07 9-Jan-09 142 8-Mar-10 29-Apr-11 172 25-Jun-12 16-Aug-13
113 17-Dec-07 6-Feb-09 143 5-Apr-10 27-May-11 173 23-Jul-12 13-Sep-13
114 14-Jan-08 6-Mar-09 144 3-May-10 24-Jun-11 174 20-Aug-12 11-Oct-13
115 11-Feb-08 3-Apr-09 145 31-May-10 22-Jul-11 175 17-Sep-12 8-Nov-13
116 10-Mar-08 1-May-09 146 28-Jun-10 19-Aug-11 176 15-Oct-12 6-Dec-13
117 7-Apr-08 29-May-09 147 26-Jul-10 16-Sep-11 177 12-Nov-12 3-Jan-14
118 5-May-08 26-Jun-09 148 23-Aug-10 14-Oct-11 178 10-Dec-12 31-Jan-14
119 2-Jun-08 24-Jul-09 149 20-Sep-10 11-Nov-11 179 7-Jan-13 28-Feb-14
120 30-Jun-08 21-Aug-09 150 18-Oct-10 9-Dec-11 180 4-Feb-13 28-Mar-14
181 4-Mar-13 25-Apr-14
182 1-Apr-13 23-May-14
183 29-Apr-13 20-Jun-14
184 27-May-13 18-Jul-14
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